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A WORLD THAT WON'T STAND STILL: ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY BY PRIVATE CONTRACT
William M. Sage* & James M. Jorling**
"Well ...
Of course the world didn't stand still. The world grew.
In a couple of years, the new highway came through
And they built it right over those two stubborn Zax
And left them there, standing un-budged in their tracks."'
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, political debate over the reform of the
United States health care system has been left behind to a consider-
able extent by changes generated from within the health care sys-
tem itself.2 Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of medical
malpractice. Like neighbors quarreling over who owns a path
through the woods, the traditional parties to the malpractice debate
have been arguing in such loud voices for so long that they have
failed to notice that the forest is being cut down, and a new town is
* Attorney, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, California. A.B., Harvard College, 1982; M.D.,
Stanford University School of Medicine, 1988; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1988.
** Attorney, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Washington, D.C. A.B., Miami University, 1981;
J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1984.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily
reflect the views of O'Melveny & Myers or Gardner, Carton & Douglas. This article is for infor-
mation only and is not intended to serve as legal advice.
The authors thank Bob Berenson, Kathie Hastings, Barbara Challan, Dan Creasey, Kent Hug-
gins, and Trischa O'Hanlon for their comments and assistance.
1. Dr. Seuss, The Zax, in THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIEs 26, 35 (1961).
2. Rather than proposing radically different ways of delivering health care, most national
health care reform legislation currently before Congress builds upon industry trends (such as capi-
tated payment systems and managed care) and attempts to lend them uniformity and fairness.
E.g., The Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Managed Competition
Act of 1993, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); The Affordable Health Care Now Act of
1993, 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993,
S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The only exceptions to this pattern are the McDermott-
Wellstone single-payor proposal contained in the American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R.
1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), which attempts to recreate the Canadian health care system
in the United States, and the Stark proposal detailed in the Mediplan Health Care Act of 1993,
H.R. 2610, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), which is based on a Medicare model.
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being built.'
"Enterprise liability,"'4 combined with alternative dispute resolu-
tion and limits on noneconomic damages, was suggested by the mal-
practice working group of the President's Task Force on Health
Care Reform as a way to align medical malpractice law with other
forces in a health care system that must deliver high-quality, cost-
effective care.5 However, entrenched interests on both sides of the
malpractice debate reacted with suspicion and alarm, and enterprise
liability never became the focus of the Clinton Administration's
malpractice proposal.
So be it. As many experts and the health care organizations that
currently assume liability explain, enterprise liability is coming any-
3. The title of a comprehensive study by the General Accounting Office says it all: U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEMS OR SO-
LUTIONS (1986).
4. "Enterprise liability" is the name given to a system in which provider organizations rather
than individual physicians bear responsibility for medical malpractice. These organizations might
include group medical practices, hospitals and hospital systems, health maintenance organizations,
and other managed care entities that are charged with both financing and delivering health care
services to a defined patient population. See William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability For
Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1994) (dis-
cussing enterprise liability comprehensively, especially its potential effect on the quality of health
care).
5. Enterprise liability for medical malpractice was first proposed as part of the American Law
Institute's Tort Reform Project using a scheme that held hospitals accountable for the actions of
physicians. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY 111-27 (Paul C. Weiler ed., 1991) (proposing a system believed to be
equitable for those injured and predictable for insurers); Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333, 355-58
(1993) (proposing that hospitals or other health care providers should bear exclusive liability for
all injuries other than those intentionally inflicted on a victim); see also Kenneth S. Abraham &
Paul C. Weiler, Organizational Liability for Medical Malpractice: An Alternative to Individual
Health Care Provider Liability for Hospital-Related Malpractice (June 29, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the DePaul Law Review) (proposing a system of organizational liability
for medical malpractice). Other scholars have made similar suggestions. See, e.g., Barry R. Fur-
row, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 985, 1030-32 (1986) (arguing that institutional liability could increase physician monitoring
and hospital record-keeping); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical
Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1746-50 (1987) (suggesting that liability be shifted either to hospi-
tals or third-party payors).
6. See David Rogers, Initial Clinton Medical Malpractice Reform Plan Pulled After Resis-
tance by Entrenched Interests, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A20 (reporting on the Clinton
Administration's retreat from enterprise liability in the face of competing lobbies of medical prov-
iders and trial lawyers). Although enterprise liability is not mandated by the Administration's
Health Security Act, the bill includes a state demonstration project to test the effect of enterprise
liability on quality of care and availability of compensation for negligent injury. H.R. 3600
§ 5311. The Physician Payment Review Commission has supported federal demonstration projects
and evaluations of existing examples of enterprise liability. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N.
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 199 (1994).
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way and, if properly implemented, will make things easier for pa-
tients, physicians, and managers." On the other hand, ill-conceived
attempts to preserve historical distinctions between liability for in-
surance behavior and for clinical care could have disastrous conse-
quences. Late last year, for example, a California jury held a promi-
nent health maintenance organization ("HMO") liable for denying
coverage for the cost of a breast cancer patient's bone marrow
transplant which the HMO argued was "experimental" treatment. 8
7. See, e.g., id. at 199; Penni Crabtree, HMOs Held More Accountable For Care, SAN DIEGO
Bus. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at I (indicating that holding health maintenance organizations ("HMOs")
liable for physician mistakes is gaining slow but steady support); Armand Leone, Jr., ADR and
Enterprise Liability, N.J. L.J., Nov. 8, 1993, at S8 (arguing that the benefits of enterprise liability
will increase with the development of alternative dispute resolution); see also Edward Felsenthal,
Medical Plans Take On Greater Liability, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1993, at B8 (reporting that
private HMO agreements and state court decisions have created enterprise liability without
legislation).
There are four general theories of enterprise liability for medical malpractice. In the first
model, hospitals and staff-model HMOs, like other employers, are generally liable for the medical
negligence of physicians whom they employ under the traditional tort doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior. See, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(extending HMO liability to acts of nonemployed "consulting physicians" selected by the HMO
staff); Stewart R. Reuter, Toward a More Realistic and Consistent Use of Respondeat Superior
in the Hospital, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 601, 663-64 (1985) (advocating a modified version of re-
spondeat superior in hospital setting based on traditional agency theory). Under the second model,
hospitals and other health care institutions are legally responsible for reviewing the credentials of
physicians seeking medical staff privileges and enforcing peer review of medical staff performance.
See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (III. 1965)
(upholding a negligence verdict, in part, because the hospital failed to review the attending physi-
cian's work or require patient consultation). Under the third model, hospitals and HMOs may be
held liable on a theory of apparent agency where the organization has advertised the competence
of its affiliated physicians or otherwise held itself out to the public as assuring quality. See, e.g.,
Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("[Tlwo factors
relevant to a finding of ostensible agency are: 1) whether the patient looks to the institution...
for care; and 2) whether the HMO 'holds out' the physician as its employee."); Kashishian v.
Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 281-87 (Wis. 1992) (expanding liability under apparent authority beyond
the emergency room context where misleading conduct by the hospital, scienter, and reliance by
the plaintiff can be shown). Finally, utilization review procedures and other financially-motivated
behavior by insurers and other managed care entities have led to malpractice litigation. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (remanding the
issue of patient liability based on a utilization review); Wickline v. State of California, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("Third party payors of health care services can be held
legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or
implementation of cost containment mechanisms ....") (dictum); see also John D. Blum, An
Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26 Hous.
L. REV. 191, 226-28 (1989) (arguing that a clear understanding of the legal liabilities inherent in
this area is essential to the use of utilization review and case management as cost containment
vehicles). The development and use of clinical practice guidelines is likely to accelerate this trend.
8. Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993). See Christine Woolsey, Jury
Hits HMOfor Coverage Denial, Bus. INS., Jan. 3, 1994, at 1, 23 (stating that the "courts have
split on whether [treatment] is warranted").
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The jury awarded $89 million to the family of the deceased patient.9
Sound business planning for all sectors of the health care industry
should therefore include the development of a consistent, coordi-
nated approach to medical liability.10 The purpose of this article is
to help health care providers and insurers create such an approach
by explaining the benefits and risks of voluntarily reassigning liabil-
ity for medical injury along an enterprise liability model, and by
outlining the legal and contractual elements that are required to do
so successfully.
I. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MEDICAL INJURY: AN ANACHRONISM
A. The Political Impasse
In the spring of 1993, President Clinton's Task Force on Health
Care Reform mentioned enterprise liability, without elaboration, as
a key component of its malpractice reform proposal. 1 Despite indi-
cations of support from large employers and some consumer
groups,' 2 enterprise liability was quickly and harshly condemned by
both organized medicine and the managed care industry, while the
trial lawyers were silently unsupportive (a fact that probably in-
creased suspicion among health care providers).' 3
Some aspects of the health care industry's reaction to enterprise
liability relate to the rapidly changing character of the health care
delivery system. Fearful of any legislative proposals that appear to
validate managed care, many medical organizations argue that en-
terprise liability would cause physicians to lose clinical autonomy."
9. Woolsey, supra note 8, at 1, 23. The case was subsequently settled for an undisclosed but
lesser sum. Don Lee, Health Net Settles Lawsuit Over Denial of Cancer Treatment, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1994, at Dl, D10.
10. Several legal scholars have advocated private, contractual approaches to improving the
medical liability system. See e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma:
Market Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 143,
170-72 (concluding that privately negotiated reforms allow consumers greater flexibility and ex-
perimentation in addressing health care issues than political or legal reforms).
11. Robert Pear, Clinton Advisers Outline Big Shift For Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1993, at Al.
12. E.g., Reactions to the Clinton Health Care Proposal, 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3600 Before
Subcomm. on Health of the House Ways and Means Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993)
(statement of Anne Marie O'Keefe, Washington Business Group on Health).
13. See David S. Starr, Enterprise Liability a "Bottomless Well," AM. MED. NEWS, June 28,
1993, at 15 (arguing that plaintiffs' lawyers favor enterprise liability because, like corporate liabil-
ity, it can lead to higher awards).
14. The American Medical Association's ("AMA") weekly newspaper straightforwardly stated:
"For enterprise liability to work, every doctor would have to be part of an 'enterprise' (and, possi-
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At the same time, some nfianaged care groups, resistant to any legis-
lation supporting the tendency of judges to hold them directly ac-
countable to patients, criticize enterprise liability on the exact oppo-
site grounds, claiming that insurers would be unable to enforce
quality-related decisions.15
For the most part, however, interest groups view enterprise liabil-
ity through the narrow lens of traditional "tort reform."1 At the
time that enterprise liability was first discussed, the Clinton Admin-
istration's position on such issues as damage caps, alternative dis-
pute resolution, attorney's fees, statutes of limitations, and collateral
source offset was unclear. Predictably, both sides assumed the worst:
provider groups feared that enterprise liability in states without tort
reform would lead to inflated verdicts against corporate defend-
ants,'17 while the trial bar worried that malpractice claims under en-
terprise liability would reduce access to the courts because it would
encourage the use of nonjudicial remedies.
Physicians and trial lawyers have been squabbling over tort re-
form for years. Organized medicine has long argued, with some jus-
tification, that unfettered liability for medical malpractice unfairly
burdens physicians and adds unnecessary cost to health care.' 8 Con-
bly, only one). Organized medicine firmly opposes such constraints." The Sinking of Enterprise
Liability, AM. MED. NEWS, July 5, 1993, at 17.
15. See Dana Priest, Clinton Advisers Discuss Plan to Shift Liability From Physicians, WASH.
POST, May 21, 1993, at A10 ("The AMA ... fears that enterprise liability would ...erode
physician autonomy by giving non-physicians more reasons to dictate how doctors do their
work."). Physician-owned malpractice insurance companies who would stand to lose a captive
market also oppose enterprise liability. Rogers, supra note 6, at A20.
16. Traditional tort reform proposals, most of which arose as the result of shortages or rapid
increases in the price of malpractice insurance that have since eased, emphasize barriers to suit
and restrictions on recovery. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COMPENDIUM OF SELECTED STATE LAWS GOVERNING MEDI-
CAL INJURY CLAIMS (1993) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] (reviewing the current status of tort re-
form laws in the fifty states). The archetype of traditional tort reform is California's Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975. See 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949 (codified as amended at CAL.
BUs. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3333.1-.2 (West Supp. 1994); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 340.5, 1295 (West 1982)) [hereinafter MICRA]. This act has served to
lower malpractice insurance premiums principally through its fixed $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages. CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 3333.2(b).
17. See Scott Shepard, "'Enterprise Liability" A Search For Deeper Pockets?, MEMPHIS BUS.
J., Aug. 2, 1992, at 14 (quoting Greg Duckett, Vice President of Baptist Memorial Health Care
System, Inc., who stated that "shifting liability is not tort reform").
18. See, e.g., Issues Relating to Medical Malpractice, 1993: Hearings on Health Care Reform
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Ways and Means Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 50
(1993) (statement by Richard F. Corlin, American Medical Association). There are certainly
many frivolous lawsuits. According to data from the Harvard Medical Practice Study, only one in
six malpractice claims met reviewers' standards for "persuasive evidence" of negligent injury. Paul
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sumer advocates and the trial bar have generally replied, also with
some justification, that bad medicine is common and that malprac-
tice suits help protect and compensate vulnerable patients.19 The
likelihood of national health care reform has added a note of ur-
gency to both voices.
B. The Reality of Change
While this debate has raged, the landscape of the American
health care system has changed dramatically. Medicine is increas-
ingly complex, specialized, and dependent on technology and sup-
port services, so that serious health problems usually require the
participation of a team of physicians working with other health pro-
fessionals using the resources of highly advanced facilities. Many
consumers are educated and demanding, and are therefore unlikely
to place their full confidence in a single physician without an inves-
tigation, disclosure, and discussion of the available options. As a re-
sult, the traditional doctor-patient relationship has been strained to
accommodate the need for coordination and communication among
providers, and for more informed and active decision-making by pa-
tients and their proxies.
Business structures have also changed. In order to keep coverage
affordable, most employers have shifted from pure third-party pay-
ment systems to various forms of managed care." This integration
C. Weiler et al., Proposal for Medical Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355, 2355 (1992) (review-
ing HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS. DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990)). There are also
many excessive jury verdicts. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice
and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1991, at 5, 6
& n.8 (recognizing empirical support for the notion that medical malpractice awards are much
greater than other personal injury suits). However, the cost implications of malpractice law are
often exaggerated. Estimates of defensive medicine are imprecise and impossible to separate from
other causes of unnecessary services, while malpractice premiums and premium equivalents
amount to only I percent of total health care costs. See ROBERT W. STURGIS. TORT COST TRENDS:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (1992).
19. See generally CALIFORNIANS FOR PATIENT RIGHTS. MICRA: IT'S TIME FOR A CHECK-UP!
(1993) (arguing that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act shifts the burden of medical
malpractice from doctors to patients). However, even if litigation helps, it doesn't help much.
Although approximately I percent of all hospitalizations lead to negligent medical care, only one
in eight such incidents gives rise to a malpractice claim, and only one in sixteen is compensated as
a result. Weiler et al., supra note 18, 2355-56.
20. See Robert A. Berenson, A Physician's View of Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Winter
1991, at 106 & n.l (describing the mixed success of managed care); see also Jonathan P. Weiner
& Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel.: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health
Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & L. 75 (1993) (reviewing past and current
1012 [Vol. 43:1007
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of financing and delivery has had two principal effects. First, deci-
sions that influence care delivery are now made by corporate enter-
prises as well as by front-line practitioners. Second, financial respon-
sibility for overall costs is now borne by providers (through
capitation arrangements,2' risk pools, and other incentives) as well
as by insurance companies. In California, approximately half of the
population is enrolled in HMOs that fully merge insurance with
medical services and offer comprehensive care to enrollees at a fixed
annual price with minimal cost-sharing.22 These organizations are
likely to be the prototypes for the integrated delivery systems that
would compete as "health plans" in the Clinton Administration's
reform proposal.2"
In conjunction with these general trends, several specific develop-
ments are occurring as health care providers and insurers join to-
gether to form organized systems of care:
* Single-specialty and multi-specialty group practices are replacing
solo physician practices and small partnerships.2 '
* Group practices are affiliating with other group practices and/or
with hospitals to form integrated provider networks to serve insurers
and large employers.
e A greater percentage of physicians are employed by HMOs, phy-
sician groups, or - in many states - hospitals.25
* Patients are receiving care from HMOs and other closed-panel
managed care organizations - some with a higher-cost, "out-of-
network" option 26 - at an increasing rate.
trends in the market for nontraditional health benefit plans).
21. See David F. Woods, Health Care Reform and the Agent, PROBE, March 21, 1994, at 1, 2
(explaining that in a fully capitated system, a provider network receives a flat fee in return for
providing health care services to the payor).
22. According to the California Department of Corporations, 48.1 percent of California's popu-
lation (between 57.1 percent and 59.4 percent of those with health insurance) are enrolled in a
health care service plan. GARY MENDOZA & WARREN BARNES, CALIFORNIA SOC'Y FOR HEALTH-
CARE ATTORNEYS, THE HEALTH CARE WORLD IN THE EYES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORPORA-
TIONS at iii (1993).
23. See H.R. 3600, § 1400 (defining "health plan").
24. Between 1969 and 1991, the percentage of nonfederal physicians practicing in groups in-
creased from 17.6 percent to 32.6 percent. Penny L. Havlicek et al., Medical Groups in the U.S.:
A Survey of Practice Characteristics 44 (1993). In 1991, 31 percent of those in group practice
worked in multi-specialty groups with fifty or more physicians. Id. at 42.
25. According to an AMA survey, 32.6 percent of physicians were employed by or party to an
independent contractor arrangement in 1992. CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN MARKETPLACE STATISTICS 1992, at 128 (Martin L. Gonzalez
ed., 1993).
26. "Out-of-network" means that patients may receive health care from practitioners who are
1994] 1013
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* Patients, especially those in HMOs, receive a comprehensive set of
health benefits, including preventive services, with fewer benefit-spe-
cific restrictions on office visits or days of treatment.27
* Health care insurers and provider organizations are applying fi-
nancial incentives, collecting practice data, and enforcing clinical
protocols to reduce unnecessary utilization of services.
* Because many managed care plans emphasize "gatekeeping" for
specialist referrals and hospital utilization, a greater percentage of
care is being provided by primary care physicians and in outpatient
settings.28
As a result of these changes, the medical malpractice system has
become obsolete. For a substantial majority of Americans, compre-
hensive health care currently is or soon will be financed, planned,
and provided by large enterprises using advanced clinical and man-
agement technologies. Equally sophisticated methods of quality
management and dispute resolution are needed to identify substan-
dard practice, promote quality improvement, and compensate in-
jured patients. Nonetheless, allegations of poor quality care are still
today settled in court by a single doctor and his or her patient with
the help of two lawyers, a judge, and a jury.29
not contractually affiliated with an established health plan. See Sage et al., supra note 4 (sug-
gesting that medical malpractice liability should be shared between health plans and out-of-net-
work practitioners under an enterprise liability system). According to the Group Health Ass6cia-
tion of America, HMO membership grew by 3.5 million in 1993, and may exceed fifty million
during 1994. Mike Mitka, Boom Year, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 10, 1994, at 2.
27. Patients with indemnity coverage, on the other hand, often face higher deductibles and co-
payments, sweeping exclusions for preexisting conditions, and cutbacks in covered benefits. How-
ever, several states have enacted "small-group insurance reform" legislation which is reversing this
trend. See John K. Iglehart, Health Care Reform - The States. 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 75, 77
(1994) (outlining a variety of approaches including mandated coverage, guaranteed renewal, and
restricted insurance rates).
28. The trend toward out-of-hospital care by primary care physicians is already being reflected
in malpractice claims. The most recent data from the Physician Insurers Association of America
("PIAA") suggests that claims against office-based general practitioners are on the rise. Thomas
E. Kirchmeier, Presentation to the American Society of Healthcare Risk Management (Oct. 25,
1993).
29. Donald M. Berwick, a leading authority on quality improvement in health care, has ob-
served that "[t]he doctor no longer really controls health care, as in the days of solo practice, but,
when it comes to quality, the doctor is still held accountable. . . .Control is shifting, structure is
shifting, the pattern of care is shifting; but accountability is not." DONALD M. BERWICK ET AL.,
CURING HEALTH CARE: NEW STRATEGIES FOR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 12 (1990).
[Vol. 43:10071014
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II. THE FUTURE: A CONTRACTUAL MODEL FOR HEALTH CARE
INJURIES
Successful integrated health care delivery systems will eventually
replace the "tort model" of medical malpractice with a "contract
model." Traditional torts, such as automobile accidents or toxic
spills, generally involve strangers. By contrast, patients and health
professionals base their actions on and derive their expectations
from a close, preexisting relationship. For this reason, medical mal-
practice law, particularly the doctrine of informed consent, includes
contractual elements.30
As managed care has become prevalent, so has the use of formal
agreements to specify many aspects of the relationships among pa-
tients, providers, and payers. For example, agreements between pa-
tients and managed care insurers, such as HMOs, govern the selec-
tion of physicians and facilities as well as the scope of coverage. To
further define the delivery as well as the cost of care, these organi-
zations negotiate agreements with physicians, medical groups, hospi-
tals, ambulatory care facilities, ancillary service providers, home
health care agencies, and other parties.'
A contractual model is essential to any national health care re-
form that entitles every American to comprehensive, cost-effective
care. One commentator has observed that "it is virtually inevitable
that a rational and decent system of care will disappoint patients'
and subscribers' expectations at critical and disputed points." 2
Therefore, it will be impossible to promote efficient medical deci-
sion-making unless patients and providers agree prospectively to
rights and remedies with respect to clinical care.33 Moreover, lim-
ited government oversight is needed to ensure that vulnerable par-
30. The doctrine of informed consent requires a physician to inform the patient of the risks
involved prior to providing treatment. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 187-88 (5th ed. 1984). See E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and
Economic Advocacy: New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275, 293-
96 (1991) (arguing that doctors should have a contractual duty to supply patients with economic
information in addition to medical information).
31. See Weiner & de Lissovoy, supra note 20, at 80-86 (describing the formal and informal
contractual relationships that underlie all arrangements for medical care delivery and financing).
32. Paul T. Menzel, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care: A Commentary, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1919, 1919 (1992).
33. The alternative to private agreement is likely to be a process of regulatory micromanage-
ment and judicial second-guessing that would be as inefficient and counterproductive to the deliv-
ery of cost-effective care as the current vague standards of medical necessity coupled with retro-
spective utilization review are to health care reimbursement and financing.
1994] 1015
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ties are not treated unfairly.
The key to understanding the benefits of enterprise liability for
medical malpractice is to recognize that existing managed care con-
tracts can address quality monitoring, clinical performance, ac-
countability for error, and dispute resolution procedures. Providers
that choose to participate in integrated health care delivery systems
therefore will be able to restructure and improve the efficiency of
the malpractice system if they accept three propositions: (1) al-
though quality management in health care is still in its infancy, one
cannot manage the cost of care without also managing its quality;
(2) in an integrated system, liability for poor quality care can be
reassigned by contract to the party best able to improve quality and
resolve disputes; and (3) courts will uphold fair contractual provi-
sions among providers and between patients and providers, including
more efficient methods of dispute resolution.
A. Backing Into Enterprise Liability
Several aspects of the developing health care marketplace have
forced participants in integrated health care delivery systems to take
on many of the responsibilities that an explicit assumption of enter-
prise liability would formalize. In particular, current and proposed
legislative reforms hold health plans and large providers accountable
for many determinants of both clinical care and dispute resolution.
1. Capitated Care and Future Medical Expenses
Many integrated health care organizations fear that bearing lia-
bility for medical malpractice would open a Pandora's box of finan-
cial risk. To the contrary, individual providers in the current system
pass their liability costs along to insurers and patients. As a result,
so long as proper safeguards exist against exceptionally high
awards,3 enterprise liability would not greatly increase malpractice
exposure. In addition, the nature of capitated care s" already makes
health plans liable for a considerable amount of the financial risk
created by malpractice. By agreeing to deliver necessary care for a
preset amount, health plans and other providers compensated on a
capitated basis bear the financial risk that an enrollee will require
34. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (proposing legal limits on damages com-
bined with binding arbitration as a safeguard to prevent grossly excessive awards).
35. See Woods, supra note 21, at 2 (describing a capitated care system).
[Vol. 43:10071016
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medical services. This includes additional medical expenses caused
by medical malpractice, which comprise about half of economic
damages and approximately one-quarter of all damages. 6 Enter-
prise liability would not increase a health plan's exposure to these
costs.3
7
2. Demand for Quality-Related Information
Until recently, the key to success for a health plan or capitated
provider has been to accept predominantly healthy patients who are
unlikely to require care. As managed care matures, however, these
organizations are being forced to compete based on the price and
quality of their health care services. This trend is being accelerated
by state and federal legislative initiatives that require health plans
to insure all applicants at a community rate and, in some cases, pay
health plans a risk-adjusted annual premium.38 Moreover, purchas-
ers of care are demanding that health plans justify their cost-cutting
measures by providing detailed information about enrollees' satis-
faction, access to services and, increasingly, health outcomes.3 9 The
Clinton Administration's reform proposal requires health plans to
disclose relevant facts to consumers choosing coverage, to meet clear
standards for truth in advertising and marketing, and to provide ad-
ditional data for verification by health care purchasers and govern-
ment regulators.' As a result, health plans and organizations are
36. The Harvard Medical Practice Study suggested that medical injuries in the group studied
resulted in a total economic cost (insured and uninsured) of $3.8 billion, including $1.95 billion in
lost wages and household production and $1.85 billion in medical care expenditures. Weiler et al.,
supra note 18, at 2356; see William G. Johnson et al., The Economic Consequences of Medical
Injuries: Implications for a No-Fault Insurance Plan, 267 JAMA 2487, 2489, 2491 (1992) (sug-
gesting that the undiscounted cost of medical injuries in the group surveyed was $21.4 billion,
including $2.6 billion in lost wages, $3.4 billion in lost household production, and $15.4 billion in
medical care expenditures).
37. Of course, some future medical expenses, notably long-term care, are not covered by most
private insurance plans. The cost of such care would therefore be in addition to a health plan's
existing obligations.
38. See, e.g., H.R. 3600, §§ 1402-03, 1541-45 (1993) (stating that each health plan offered by
a regional alliance or a corporate alliance must enroll every alliance-eligible individual who seeks
enrollment using a community rate and that risk adjustment methodologies must be developed);
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1357(i)-(k) (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth criteria, includ-
ing geographic requirements, that health care services must follow in determining employee risk
rates).
39. See, e.g., Data Watch, A Profile of Outcomes Research, Bus. & HEALTH, Jan. 1994, at 16
(providing survey results on health outcomes).
40. H.R. 3600, §§ 1404, 1410-13, 5000-13.
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being held accountable for quality as never before.' 1
3. The Convergence of Coverage and Care
The present lack of meaningful liability on the part of managed
care insurers stems in part from a historical distinction between cov-
erage disputes and malpractice claims. As managed care organiza-
tions blend the financing of health insurance with the delivery of
health care services, however, coverage decisions are increasingly
likely to have direct clinical consequences.42 At the same time, the
benefits offered by health plans are more often comprehensive and
based on case management principles rather than arbitrary limits on
hospital days or physician visits.' 3  Consequently, claims against
health plans are likely to raise clinical as well as insurance issues."
The convergence of litigation over insurance coverage and medical
malpractice is in part stating the obvious. In a health care system
where all "medically appropriate" care is covered by health plans,
coverage decisions are necessarily decisions about medical appropri-
ateness and therefore implicate the standard of clinical care.
4. Demonstrating Responsiveness to Consumers
One obstacle to the efficient resolution of clinical disputes has
been the health plans' and care managers' lack of control over the
selection of providers and treatments by beneficiaries. However, the
increasing popularity of HMOs and other closed-panel delivery sys-
41. Enterprise liability would add to this requirement for quality-related information direct lia-
bility for a practitioner's failure to obtain the informed consent of his patients. See KEETON ET
AL., supra note 30, § 32, at 189-92 (discussing the doctrine of informed consent).
42. Courts have begun'to recognize this trend. See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr.
876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment be-
cause genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the conduct of the decedent's insurance com-
pany was a substantial factor in causing the decedent's death); Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr.
810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (dictum) (holding that a third-party payor may be held liable for medi-
cally inappropriate decisions); see also Abraham et al., supra note 5, at 355 (proposing a new
system of organizational liability in which individual hospitals and health maintenance organiza-
tions bear responsibility for medical malpractice).
43. This trend will increase if exclusions for preexisting conditions and other health-related
limitations on benefits are prohibited by law. See H.R. 3600, §§ 1402-03, 1541-45 (stating that
no plan may limit enrollees based on their health status or their anticipated need for health care).
44. The recent decision in Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993) dem-
onstrates this tendency, although it was litigated as a coverage issue. See infra notes 131-33 and
accompanying text (reviewing the decision in Health Net and concluding that in any system of
comprehensive HMO-style health insurance, disputes over coverage are, by definition, disputes
over the standard of care).
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tems has made the health plan, rather than the individual physician,
the first point of contact for many consumers. Competitive pressures
are leading health plans to emphasize administrative accessibility,
both to reduce unnecessary utilization of services and to handle
questions or complaints. The government is similarly concerned.
Under the Health Security Act, for example, consumers are assured
access to health plan-based grievance procedures and to adjudica-
tion of disputes over coverage and benefits by state and federal ad-
ministrative and judicial bodies.4 The result of these forces is likely
to be health plans that are better equipped to resolve disputes and
plans that are held accountable for doing so fairly, whether or not
they technically bear enterprise liability.
B. Benefits of Assuming Enterprise Liability
There are several advantages to an explicit, coordinated system of
enterprise liability. The ultimate success of managed care depends
in great part on the erosion of traditional barriers to collaboration
among participants in the delivery of health care services. The tradi-
tional malpractice system retards this process. Breaking this logjam
may therefore benefit all sectors: insurers, managed care companies,
health facilities, provider groups, individual physicians, and nonphy-
sician practitioners.
1. Physician Loyalty and Teamwork
Enterprise liability should help improve relations between clinical
managers and front-line physicians. Existing managed care arrange-
ments often place managed care companies and health professionals
at cross-purposes. Insurers conducting utilization review bear little
responsibility for injuries resulting from inadequate care, and are
thus tempted to control costs by imposing arbitrary restrictions on
services. On the other hand, physicians - who are often more anx-
ious about malpractice litigation than about cost-effectiveness -
may be led by their malpractice carriers to practice wasteful, defen-
sive medicine. This adversarial process is better suited to courtrooms
than to clinics.
If health plans or other institutions bear responsibility for individ-
ual instances of malpractice, relieving physicians of that burden,
practitioners should have greater confidence that care management
45. H.R. 3600, §§ 1405, 5201-43.
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decisions are being conducted with attention to quality. This should
lead to better teamwork, especially as the health care industry con-
solidates and physicians become closely affiliated with a smaller
number of organizations. Specifically, managers and administrators
should ascribe increased importance to the contributions that clini-
cians can make to the organization's policies and protocols, and phy-
sicians should be less resentful of practice guidelines or other cost-
oriented care management strategies."'
2. Quality Improvement
Once these impediments to cooperation are overcome, health
plans and other institutional providers will have certain advantages
over individual practitioners with respect to quality assessment and
improvement. As noted above, quality-related information will con-
stitute an important competitive advantage for product marketing
and regulatory compliance.4 For example, health care institutions
serve populations large enough to collect statistically valid samples,
and they possess the financial resources to develop medical informa-
tion systems to analyze this data and communicate recommenda-
tions."8 These activities form the basis of "total quality manage-
ment" ("TQM") and "continuous quality improvement" ("CQI"),
two management initiatives which are rapidly gaining favor in the
health care industry.4 9
A managed care environment should also facilitate risk manage-
ment, as care-related errors often have institutional causes and solu-
tions. Clinical performance in the managed care setting may be in-
fluenced by staffing decisions, institutional capacity to deliver
certain services, utilization policies, and clinical protocols.50 For ex-
46. See Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice?, 321 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1306, 1310 (1989) (suggesting that the perceived threat of malpractice litigation prevents
physicians from adopting clinically sound practice guidelines).
47. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing consumers' demand for quality-
related information).
48. See David C. Kibbe & Richard P. Scoville, Computer Software for Health Care CQJ, I
QUALITY MGMT. HEALTH CARE 59 (1993); Stephen J. McPhee et al., Promoting Cancer Preven-
tion Activities by Primary Care Physicians, 266 JAMA 538, 542 (1991).
49. See Glenn Laffel & Donald M. Berwick, Quality in Health Care, 268 JAMA 407, 408
(1992) (discussing TQM and the need to better integrate research results into routine care activi-
ties to'improve the quality of health care); The Quality March, Hosps. & HEALTH NETWORKS,
Jan. 5, 1994, at 45 (reviewing the results of a national survey of hospital quality improvement
activities).
50. For example, studies of surgical hospitalizations have strongly suggested that institutional
and group characteristics ("hospital effect") predict performance to a greater degree than individ-
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ample, the most common cause of serious medication errors with
respect to antibiotics is a failure to note a patient's known allergy,51
a mistake that can be addressed at the institutional level by devoting
greater resources to eliciting information, developing more effective
charting and communication among providers, and maintaining a
work environment that promotes attentiveness.
Also, health care enterprises apply information technologies and
quality improvement principles to their decisions to contract with
physicians and to extend specific clinical privileges. Increasingly,
health plans are assessing physicians' patterns of utilization and ex-
pense as they form provider networks. This practice, called "eco-
nomic credentialing, ' provokes concern among physicians and the
public because it appears to exclude considerations of quality. By
contrast, health care organizations that elect to bear enterprise lia-
bility should necessarily focus on quality as well as on cost when
they make affiliation decisions, and should therefore attract higher-
quality physicians. Moreover, an organization's ability to terminate
its affiliation with or withdraw privileges from a physician may serve
as a powerful inducement for individual practitioners to improve the
way they practice.
3. Administrative Efficiency
Another clear benefit of enterprise liability is that it will coordi-
nate the grievance process and the defense of malpractice actions.
About 25 percent of malpractice claims involve two or more defend-
ants.58 In these situations, avoidable claims may be filed because
some participants in a patient's course of care have not been ap-
prised of a bad outcome; for example, a large hospital bill may be
sent to a patient who is considering bringing suit against an uncom-
municative physician. In addition, meritorious claims may not be
resolved promptly because parties are unaware of all the relevant
facts until the suit is filed and discovery has commenced. Finally,
ual characteristics ("surgeon effect"). ANN BARRY FLOOD & W. RICHARD SCOTT, HOSPITAL
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 227-77 (1987).
51. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, MEDICATION ERROR STUDY 6-7
(1993).
52. See Michael J. Baxter, Exclusive Contracting: The Original Economic Credentialing 26 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 97 (1993) (analyzing medical institutions' use of economic credentialing in
evaluating the performance of physicians under exclusive contracts).
53. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF
CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, at 26 (1987).
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groundless or questionable claims may receive undeserved compen-
sation because plaintiffs' attorneys will exploit the tendency of mul-
tiple defendants with varying insurance coverage to implicate each
other. Focusing responsibility for medical injury on a single party is
a simple way to reduce these transaction costs.
A health plan or large institutional provider is also likely to be a
more efficient purchaser of liability insurance.5" As is the case with
small-group health insurance, selling malpractice coverage to indi-
vidual physicians requires a substantial investment in marketing and
brokerage services as well as increased paperwork and other admin-
istrative costs. Large institutions are capable of self-insuring55 low-
level risk and can drive a hard bargain with carriers for excess
coverage.
Reassigning liability to one organization in an integrated delivery
system has the additional advantage of diversifying the malpractice
risk associated with particular specialties across a broad range of
clinical services. This should be attractive to managed care physi-
cians in high-risk areas, such as obstetrics, who might otherwise be
subject to substantial increases in premiums as the result of a single
large claim in their region and specialty. It may also benefit primary
care physicians in managed care networks who are performing an
increasing number and range of clinical services in their offices.
Traditional malpractice carriers are accustomed to selling insurance
for these activities only to highly paid specialists, and may not be
able to offer immediate coverage to primary care physicians at ac-
ceptable prices.
III. SETTING Up AN ENTERPRISE LIABILITY SYSTEM
An effective contractual framework for malpractice liability
should, at a minimum, include the following characteristics:
- Financial responsibility for damages from medical malpractice af-
fecting a defined patient group should be borne primarily by a single
enterprise in each integrated health care system.56
54. For example, hospitals that operate channeling programs are able to offer below-market
rates to participating physicians. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text (reviewing chan-
neling programs offered by the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies and the Harvard Affiliated
Medical Institutions which have reduced physicians' insurance premiums).
55. See Diana Slivinska, Comment, Health Care Cost-Containment for Small Businesses: The
Self-Insurance Option, 12 J.L. & COM 333, 334 (1993) (describing the benefits of self-insurance
for large companies).
56. For example, a health plan that chooses to bear enterprise liability on behalf of its network
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- The enterprise that bears primary liability should conduct risk
management and quality improvement activities, and should base
privileging and/or compensation decisions for affiliated providers at
least in part on quality-related performance.
* Certain other enterprises contracting with the primary enterprise
should bear liability and engage in risk management and quality
improvement with respect to discrete episodes of care that are
uniquely within the control of such enterprises.5 8
physicians might include a provision resembling the following in its physician contracts (and
might have analogous agreements with its contract hospitals):
Health Plan agrees to indemnify and hold Physician harmless from any and all
claims relating to the Physician's or Health Plan's provision of medical services to any
Beneficiary of Health Plan, except that Physician shall indemnify Health Plan for any
losses, damages, and expenses resulting from a claim or judgment based on allega-
tions of the intentional, wilful, wanton, or grossly negligent actions of Physician in
providing medical services to Beneficiaries of Health Plan. Health Plan agrees to
maintain insurance for these claims. Physician agrees that Health Plan shall be sub-
stituted for Physician in any suit or arbitration filed against Physician relating to the
provision of medical services to Beneficiaries of Health Plan. Physician shall make
every effort to ensure that such substitution occurs and Physician shall cooperate in
the defense of any lawsuit against Health Plan based on allegations of Physician's
improper treatment of a Beneficiary.
57. Agreements between a health plan and its network physicians might include language with
respect to privileging and risk management such as the following (the health plan's Physician
Manual should make it clear that input from and participation by physicians in developing quality
control systems is encouraged):
Participating Physicians shall comply fully with, and participate in the implementa-
tion of, Health Plan's policies and programs, as described below and in Health Plan's
Physician Manual, to promote high standards of medical care and to control the cost
and utilization of medical services, including, without limitation, policies and pro-
grams regarding: (i) quality assurance; (ii) utilization management; (iii) claims pay-
ment review; (iv) Subscriber grievances; (v) Physician privileging and credentialing;
and (vi) Physician sanctioning. Physicians shall abide by the determination of Health
Plan on all such matters during the term of this Agreement.
Health Plan shall establish and maintain a physician privileging and credentialing
program, under which Health Plan shall establish privileging criteria and credential-
ing processes. Physicians shall abide by the terms of the privileging and credentialing
program and shall meet the privileging criteria. During each term of this Agreement,
Health Plan shall take reasonable steps to ensure that each Physician continues to
abide by the terms of the privileging and credentialing program and continues to meet
the privileging criteria.
Health Plan shall establish and operate Utilization Management and Quality As-
surance Programs ("UMQAP") with respect to services rendered to Subscribers by
Physicians. Such programs shall include, without limitation, requiring Physicians to
refer Subscribers to Participating Providers in accordance with guidelines established
by Health Plan as part of the UMQAP. Physicians shall abide by the terms of the
UMQAP, and Health Plan shall administer and take reasonable steps to ensure com-
pliance by Physicians with the UMQAP.
58. For example, an academic health center that elects to assume liability with respect to pa-
tients it serves under contract to a health plan might include something along the following lines
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* Enrollment agreements with subscribers and consent agreements
for patient treatment should specify the enterprise liable for mal-
practice 9 and should set forth an efficient and consistent process for
dispute resolution. 0
A. Assumption of Liability
In the traditional world of fee-for-service health care, each li-
censed health care provider that is found negligent in the course of
in its agreement with the health plan (at the same time, utilization review provisions should em-
phasize that the academic health center bears primary responsibility for quality control):
University agrees to indemnify and hold Health Plan harmless from any and all
claims relating to University's and Faculty's provision of medical services and hospital
services pursuant to this Agreement. University agrees to maintain insurance for these
claims. Health Plan shall cooperate in the defense of any lawsuit against University
based on allegations relating to improper treatment of a Beneficiary of Health Plan.
59. A liability provision in a health plan's enrollment agreement with a subscriber might look
something like this:
By electing medical and hospital coverage pursuant to this Agreement, or accepting
benefits hereunder, all Subscribers, and any beneficiaries of Subscribers, their repre-
sentatives, agents, heirs and assigns, agree to waive any current or future right to sue
or make a claim against any Provider for providing medical or hospital services pursu-
ant to this Agreement, whether such right or claim is based in contract, common law,
or statute. Health Plan agrees to accept responsibility for and be substituted for any
such Provider for any such claim. Subscriber agrees to sue or make any such claim
against Health Plan instead of such Provider and further agrees to substitute Health
Plan in any action where such Provider is so named. Health Plan hereby notifies Sub-
scriber that Health Plan has entered, and may in the future enter, into agreements
with certain Providers pursuant to which such Providers are obligated to indemnify
Health Plan and hold Health Plan harmless from certain claims involving such Prov-
iders; provided, however, that such agreements shall not affect the rights and duties of
Subscriber under this paragraph.
60. The following is an example of how an arbitration provision in the agreement between a
health plan and its subscribers might be drafted:
By electing medical and hospital coverage pursuant to this Agreement, or accepting
benefits hereunder, all Subscribers, and any beneficiaries of the Subscribers, their rep-
resentatives, agents, heirs and issigns, agree that any and all controversies or claims
which may arise out of or in connection with the medical services or hospital services
provided or rendered by a Provider to a Subscriber under the terms of this Agreement
shall be submitted to arbitration as provided for herein. Any dispute hereunder shall
be submitted to arbitration by sending a written demand for arbitration to the other
party and shall be settled in [location]. Each party to the arbitration shall select one
arbitrator, and the two arbitrators shall choose a third arbitrator. The three arbitra-
tors shall hear and decide the case in accordance with the Medical Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association. The parties hereby agree to accept the deci-
sion and award of the arbitrators as their exclusive remedy and as final and binding
between them, and agree that no suit at law or in equity based upon disputes, contro-
versies or claims covered by this paragraph shall be instituted by Subscriber or
Health Plan, except an action to compel arbitration pursuant to this paragraph or an
action to enforce the award of the arbitrators. Subscriber specifically and expressly
waives any right to a jury trial or trial by a judge in a court of law or equity.
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care of an injured patient is jointly and severally liable for dam-
ages." Although the law is changing, insurers and other managed
care organizations who are not licensed providers have been held
responsible for negligent care, as opposed to a denial of benefits,
only under unusual circumstances. 2
In an integrated delivery system, however, it makes sense that the
party most directly responsible for the cost of coverage should also
bear primary liability for improper care. This will usually be the
health plan in which a subscriber enrolls .6  Health plans have sev-
eral advantages in performing this function. First, they are well cap-
italized and therefore reliable and efficient bearers of risk. Second,
they are charged with coordinating the provision of care and are
therefore best able to balance quality and cost considerations in
their management decisions. Third, they are the entry point for sub-
scribers joining the system, and can offer contractual provisions for
dispute resolution at a time when individuals are free to choose
among various health plans and are therefore better able to make
uncoerced decisions than they might be as patients seeking
treatment.
Tightly integrated staff- and group-model HMOs are in the best
position to assume liability in the current market. The closed-panel
character of their medical staffs, combined with the physical prox-
imity among their practitioners' offices, give many of these organi-
zations a corporate (or university) "feel." This environment is con-
ducive to assessing quality of care using traditional "peer review ''6 ,
processes and to influencing practice patterns through conferences,
newsletters, and institutional guidelines and protocols.
However, Kaiser-style HMOs are unlikely to dominate most mar-
kets as the health care system evolves nationally. Excess capacity in
61. See MICHAEL G. MACDONALD ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
§ 14.04[6] (1993) (stating that "all defendants in a negligence lawsuit are liable directly to the
plaintiff in the entire award even though each may have been responsible for only a portion of the
damages"). The doctrine of joint and several liability has been limited in several states. Id.
62. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for enterprise liability).
63. The term "health plan" does not necessarily imply a system run by insurers. If the Admin-
istration's Health Security Act becomes law, or other reforms create incentives for care manage-
ment rather than risk management, many of the most successful health plans are likely to be
centered around physician groups or hospitals. E.g., H.R. 3600, §§ 1400, 1402-03.
64. See, e.g., LOWELL C. BROWN, CALIFORNIA SOC'Y FOR HEALTHCARE ATTORNEYS, MEDICAL
STAFF AND MEDICAL PEER GROUP PEER REVIEW IN THE ERA OR PROVIDER INTEGRATION:
CREDENTIALING, FAIR HEARINGS, AND CONFIDENTIALITY (1993) (discussing reasons for establish-
ing a peer review committee for reviewing the quality of care provided by independent practice
associations).
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many markets, the high capital costs and limited useful lives associ-
ated with constructing health facilities, the improved cost-effective-
ness of outpatient and community-based care, and the necessarily
incremental growth of managed care as a percentage of a physi-
cian's practices all favor looser structures such as network-model
HMOs. Nonetheless, these organizations will increasingly be capa-
ble of bearing malpractice liability and exerting effective quality
control as medical information systems improve and performance
data is collected for purposes of cost control, marketing, and regula-
tory compliance.
In less mature managed care markets, provider organizations that
are not fully integrated health plans will negotiate discounted fee-
for-service or capitated arrangements with insurers. Enterprises
such as multi-specialty group practices, university hospitals, and
physician-hospital ventures such as physician-hospital organizations
("PHOs")65 that receive a combined rate for both professional and
institutional services may find it advantageous to assume malprac-
tice liability and develop their own quality management capacities.
Specific issues that might arise in these situations are discussed be-
low in the context of arrangements in which a health plan might
transfer liability to such providers for certain services. 6
Several examples of voluntary enterprise liability currently exist.
Liability for the negligent acts of staff physicians is expressly as-
sumed by managed care entities such as Kaiser-Permanente and
Sharp Health Care,67 and by government delivery systems such as
the Public Health Service, 68 the Department of Defense,69 the Vet-
65. Physician Hospital Organizations are joint ventures wherein hospitals and physicians join
together to create a delivery system that can directly contract with managed care organizations,
insurance companies, or employers. DAVID E. VOGEL, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE
PHYSICIAN AND MANAGED CARE 14 (1993).
66. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text (discussing the reallocation of liability risk).
67. See Crabtree, supra note 7 (stating that the Sharp Health Plan accepts medical malprac-
tice liability for the physicians with whom it contracts).
68. Under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 201
(Supp. IV 1992), community and migrant health center grantees receive federal medical malprac-
tice insurance coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992). See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ESTI-
MATED SAVINGS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL INSURANCE AT HEALTH CENTERS (1993) (examining
medical malpractice insurance costs of federally-funded community health centers and migrant
health centers).
69. See 32 C.F.R. § 61 (1993) (allowing malpractice claims against military and civilian per-
sonnel of the armed forces).
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erans Administration, the Indian Health Service,71 and the Bureau
of Prisons. 2 Other medical institutions, such as the Federation of
Jewish Philanthropies in New York and the Harvard Affiliated
Medical Institutions in Boston, do not directly assume liability but
rather purchase malpractice insurance for their affiliated
physicians.73
B. Distribution of Liability
It is axiomatic that one should never take responsibility for what
one cannot control. Because the health care industry has only re-
cently begun to consolidate into organized systems of care, many
health plans may not be immediately capable of performing effec-
tive quality control. Therefore, enterprises may choose to bear pri-
mary liability only if they can, in many instances, transfer such lia-
bility to other enterprises within their integrated system that are
better positioned to manage cost and quality with respect to certain
discrete episodes of care. It should not be difficult to account for the
financial consequences of reassigning liability as part of a managed
care contract, although certain features of the current insurance
market must be considered.74
Many organizations participating in health plan networks possess
the size and diversification to be efficient risk-bearers and the utili-
zation review and care management mechanisms to facilitate inter-
nal quality improvement. Put another way, the same consideration
that leads some managed care organizations to compensate constitu-
ent providers by capitation or utilization-based withholding 75 - the
70. See 38 C.F.R. § 14.514 (1993) (allowing the Department of Veterans Affairs to indemnify
a department employee who is personally named as a defendant or settle or compromise a per-
sonal damage claim against an employee); 38 C.F.R. § 14.610 (1993) (permitting suits against
Department of Veterans Affairs employees based upon medical care and treatment).
71. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing that
the head of each federal agency may compromise and settle any claim against the United States
for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act of an employee).
72. See 28 C.F.R. § 543.30 (1993) (providing that the Bureau of Prisons shall consider in-
mates' claims asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
73. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text (reviewing the channeling programs of the
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies and the Harvard Affiliated Medical Institutions).
74. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (discussing the current insurance market-
place and the challenges it poses to new health care enterprises).
75. Current managed care contracts frequently involve the assumption of some degree of finan-
cial risk for overutilization. See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal
Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 480-504 (1988) (outlining
several plans involving the assumption of some degree of financial risk in overutilization); cf. Alex-
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perception that such providers can control costs more effectively
than the organization as a whole - will lead organizations to allo-
cate malpractice risk along similar lines.
As a general rule, tightly-integrated systems will transfer liability
in fewer situations than loosely-integrated systems. For example, a
"staff-model" ' 6 HMO with salaried physicians may transfer liability
only for organ transplantation or other highly specialized care for
which the HMO contracts with outside parties, such as academic
health centers. 7  In addition, a "single-service" 7 8 HMO would be
likely to accept liability for the care it provides. These organizations
will be attractive contract partners for many integrated systems be-
cause they can achieve efficiencies and economies of scale in areas,
such as eye care, dental care or some orthopedic care, that are es-
sentially severable from a beneficiary's other health care needs.79
By contrast, a loosely-integrated "network-model" 80 HMO may
negotiate agreements that transfer liability to physician groups re-
sponsible for "gatekeeping," to hospitals providing specialized ser-
vices, or to contracting and quality-control joint ventures. Under
these contracts, physicians who are employed by an institution, such
as interns and residents at a hospital or associates in a group prac-
tice, would be automatically covered by the terms of the contract
between the institution and the plan. Other affiliated practitioners
might reach agreement with the institution with respect to
coverage. 81
ander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in
the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 708, 725-28, 748-50 (1986)
(describing the allocation of financial risk in HMOs and prepaid practice groups); but see 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (prohibiting payments made. to induce a reduc-
tion of services to Medicare beneficiaries).
76. This term describes an organizational structure in which the physicians are salaried em-
ployees of the HMO. THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 16 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed.,
1989) [hereinafter HEALTH HANDBOOK].
77. Although some closed-panel HMOs currently have the size and quality review capacity to
bear risk efficiently and to respond appropriately to incentives, those characteristics are most fre-
quently found in hospitals and other large institutions. See Abraham et al., supra note 5, at 355-
56 (proposing a new model of organizational liability wherein hospitals would bear exclusive lia-
bility for medical malpractice).
78. A single-service HMO offers only one component of a comprehensive benefits package and
specializes in that service only. VOGEL, supra note 65, at 8.
79. Id.
80. A network-model HMO contracts with one or more physician group practices, which are
responsible for providing all physician services to HMO members assigned to the group. HEALTH
HANDBOOK, supra note 76, at 16.
81. It would prove inefficient to recreate the current malpractice system by transferring liability
for the same clinical episode to more than one party or by leaving liability risk on individual
1028 [Vol. 4.3:1007
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C. Cooperative Quality Management
Any future health care system will either reward providers based
on measurable performance, such as health care outcomes, or allow
providers to balance cost and quality within a fixed budget using
capitation. Capitated arrangements are likely to predominate in the
short term because true performance measures are still in their in-
fancy. 2 Purchasers of capitated care, including HMOs or insurers
that compensate their contract provider groups on a capitated basis,
may favor compensation arrangements that include liability for mal-
practice, so that the capitated party must demonstrate attention to
quality as well as cost consciousness."
However, institutional quality control capacity may be underde-
veloped in many managed care organizations, especially physician
networks, management service organizations ("MSOs"),84 PHOs, 85
and other contracting vehicles that lack a defined physical plant. As
has been discussed, organizations that are centered around hospitals
or other traditional health care facilities have the advantage of
ongoing peer review,8' credentialing, and quality control processes.
In addition, a regulatory environment has developed that sets cer-
tain standards for the conduct of these activities.87
In contrast, nonhospital provider entities must develop quality
physicians.
82. See The Quality March, supra note 49, at 46 (stating that "smaller hospitals have not yet
initiated budgeting and performance appraisal systems that promote quality improvement efforts,
while larger hospitals have difficulty implementing such changes due to their size").
83. This should not be interpreted as favoring liability for individual physicians, which would
be contrary to the entire concept of enterprise liability. In general, very small business units, such
as individual physicians, are neither efficient quality managers nor efficient risk-bearers. There-
fore, both capitation risk and liability risk should gravitate toward provider-oriented enterprises
that are somewhat larger.
84. A management (or mutual) service organization ("MSO") is an organization formed by a
group of independent physicians that does not economically integrate them, but offers practice
enhancement and management services such as billing and collection. DAVID C. MAIN, AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, FORMING PHYSICIAN NETWORKS 7 (1993).
85. See VOGEL, supra note 65, at 14 (defining PHOs).
86. Peer review is the process by which the diagnosis, care, and treatment of patients is re-
viewed and evaluated by those who have training and experience similar to the professional being
evaluated. See generally Brown, supra note 64 (discussing some of the issues and problems
presented by a peer review system).
87. At least ten states require hospitals to have risk management programs. MACDONALD ET
AL., supra note 61, § 12.02[2]. In addition, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO") requires hospital risk management programs to include ongoing as-
sessments of patient care, and requires hospitals and their medical staffs to establish a variety of
oversight committees. JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, I
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 42, 56 (1994).
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control processes without the benefit of an established legal frame-
work. For example, Independent Practice Association ("IPA")-
model 8 HMOs should have a credentialing and peer review mecha-
nism in place that affords adequate due process and confidentiality
to both the examiners and the examinees.89 These activities include
gathering information from and sharing information with other pro-
vider organizations as well as reaching conclusions about specific
clinical incidents; both activities necessarily raise antitrust and tort
liability risks that are inadequately addressed by current law. 90
Therefore, enterprises that elect to bear malpractice liability should
include in their agreements with individual practitioners the ability
to receive and disclose relevant facts, and they should impose on
practitioners a strict duty to verify and update their credentials and
other performance-related information.
Quality control can be challenging even for established, inte-
grated health plans that have effective systems in place if patients
receive a certain proportion of their care from practitioners who are
not contractually affiliated with the plan. This generally occurs in
one of two circumstances. First, many health plans offer so-called
"point-of-service" plans with out-of-network options.91 In these ar-
rangements, patients may obtain care from the practitioner of their
choice, without seeking approval from the health plan, by incurring
a higher co-payment and annual limit on out-of-pocket expendi-
tures. Second, patients requiring emergency services often seek care
at the closest facility, whether or not it is part of their health plan.
Contracts accepting liability for malpractice affecting enrollees
should plainly and expressly disclaim liability for actions of non-
network physicians, including care sought in emergency situations.
However, health plans should be aware that these disclaimers might
not withstand legal scrutiny if the facts suggest that the plan did not
make the needed services reasonably available.
88. IPAs are usually corporations formed by independent practitioners who contract to provide
services to various payors. MAIN, supra note 84, at 8.
89. See Brown, supra note 64, at 17-18 (explaining that the trend toward sharing peer group
information by institutional healthcare providers conflicts with the need to maintain
confidentiality).
90. For example, it is not clear whether the immunities conferred by the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-111, 11152 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991), necessarily
extend to new types of provider organizations.
91. The Health Security Act requires all health plans to offer a point-of-service option. See
H.R. 3600, § 1402(d)(2) (stating that each health plan shall offer enrollees the opportunity to
obtain coverage for out-of-network services).
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D. Agreements With Patients
Health plans, hospitals, and any other entities that accept enter-
prise liability and enter into contractual relationships with health
care consumers should inform those consumers of the transfer of
liability and should specifically require consumers to waive their
rights against the direct provider of care and to bring claims solely
against the liable enterprise. The enrollment or patient care contract
should also specify an efficient method of dispute resolution for
those claims, such as binding arbitration.
Specifying in advance that only the liable enterprise will be sub-
ject to suit serves to influence consumers' expectations about the
care they will receive and the proper mechanism for dispute resolu-
tion. Doing so may also reduce strategic behavior by entrepreneurial
attorneys seeking several sources of compensation. However, courts
can be expected to scrutinize contractual provisions to ensure that
they are not "contracts of adhesion" '92 and that they do not deny
patients their rights to due process.93
Although there are no reported judicial decisions with respect to
such provisions in an enterprise liability context, it seems likely that
courts will hold a transfer of liability enforceable if it does not ma-
terially reduce a plaintiff's right to fair compensation. Therefore,
providers and health plans assuming enterprise liability must make
sure that the responsible party is solvent, either through adequate
capitalization and reserves or through insurance.94 Courts may also
look to the ease of bringing a claim against the substituted defend-
ant. Therefore, health plans should ensure that their grievance pro-
cedures and dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, and that
consumers have been informed about their options through the use
of marketing literature, enrollment material, and customer satisfac-
tion surveys.
92. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract offered for goods or services on essentially
a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. The distinctive feature of a contract of adhesion is that the weaker
party has no realistic choice as to the terms of the contract. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th
ed. 1990).
93. MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 61, § 14.07[2). Contracts entered into by health plan sub-
scribers during open enrollment periods are likely to be given greater deference than those signed
by patients who are ill and anxiously awaiting treatment. Id. § 14.07[2](b].
94. A relevant analogy is to the "alter ego" theory of corporate liability. 18 C.J.S. Corpora-
tions § 12 (1990) (discussing the alter ego doctrine and its purpose of preventing entities from
escaping responsibility for their acts or liabilities by hiding behind a corporate shield). One factor
used to determine whether a corporation is simply the alter ego of its owners is whether the
corporation is undercapitalized. Id.
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Moreover, it is possible that contractual enterprise liability can
function effectively without consumers agreeing to sue only the lia-
ble enterprise. For example, the enrollment agreements used by the
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan ("KFHP") do not contractually re-
quire enrollees to bring suit solely against KFHP, although all
claims arising from treatment remain subject to KFHP's arbitration
requirement. If an individual physician in the Permanente Medical
Group, is to be named in a malpractice suit (information about
which is available as a result of the requirement that ninety-day
advance notice of actions be given under California law),95 KFHP
notifies the plaintiff's attorney that KFHP will defend the suit. Most
experienced plaintiff's attorneys subsequently amend their com-
plaints to remove the physician as defendant, although some do not.
Enrollment and treatment agreements should also require patients
to arbitrate their claims or use other forms of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR"). 96 Although most states permit arbitration- of
medical claims,9" the legality and contract requirements in each
state must be reviewed carefully before drafting an arbitration pro-
vision. For example, voluntary binding arbitration is effective in
most states and can apply to future as well as existing controversies
in all but Alabama and West Virginia. 98 Some states limit enforce-
ability to enumerated types of actions, such as construction claims, 99
while others expressly exclude certain actions such as torts and per-
sonal injury. 100 In addition, several states have specific statutory re-
95. CAL, CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 364, 364.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) The Permanente Medi-
cal Group is a professional partnership that maintains an exclusive contract with KFHP.
96. Some types of coordinated medical liability may not require ADR. For example, neither
the Harvard Affiliated Medical Institutions nor the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies include
arbitration provisions in their own risk management programs or in their "channeling" arrange-
ments. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text (discussing the programs offered by the
Harvard Affiliated Medical Institutions and the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies). However,
an efficient administrative approach to dispute resolution will very likely be essential in a health
care system comprised of integrated health plans. Cf. H.R. 3600, §§ 5201-43, 5302 (explaining
the appropriate procedures for making benefit claims or requests for preauthorization of services).
97. See generally COMPENDIUM, supra note 16 (reveiwing various pieces of state legislation
authorizing arbitration of medical malpractice claims).
98. See 1 MILES J. ZAREMSKI & Louis S. GOLDSTEIN, MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL NEGLIGENCE§ 4.03 (1988) (discussing arbitration statutes as a means of alternative dispute resolution).
99. Although it no longer applies to present-day construction claims, Georgia law still excludes
from arbitration any claims arising out of construction contracts made between July 1, 1978 and
July 1, 1988. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2 (Harrison 1990).
100. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie Supp. 1993) (providing that its uniform
arbitration act does not apply to either tort or personal injury actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401
(1992) (providing that the state's uniform arbitration act does not apply to tort actions).
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quirements for agreements affecting malpractice claims in order to
ensure that patients are aware of the proposed arbitration provisions
when they accept treatment. 101 Such requirements can include al-
lowing a rescissionary period, mandating that the agreement be in
writing and in a separate document, prohibiting arbitration as a
condition to receiving emergency care, and using clear language to
waive the right to a jury trial. 10 2
The fairness of arbitration provisions has been attacked mainly on
two grounds. One theory is that the patient has no real choice but to
accept arbitration in order to receive care (a "contract of adhe-
sion").' 03 The other theory is that the patient did not knowingly
waive his right to a jury trial.'04 Generally, arbitration agreements
that comply with specific statutory requirements have been up-
held. 10 5 In California, binding arbitration of malpractice disputes
was upheld even before the state's medical arbitration act was
passed in 1975.106 Judicial decisions in California suggest that arbi-
tration provisions are especially likely to be sustained where group
purchasers such as large employers have negotiated contracts with
health plans. 07 This logic should also apply to health plans compet-
101. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (requiring specific words to be
printed in bold red type to notify the signer that he is giving up the right to a jury or court trial);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3060 (1993) (providing that the commissioner shall approve forms of
agreement for use by health care providers and hospitals which shall include a provision for arbi-
tration); Id. §§ 600.5041-.5042 (1987) (describing agreements for health care providers, hospi-
tals, and HMOs, including a patient's right to rescind the agreement printed in bold type); see
generally Leone, supra note 7 (emphasizing that patients must receive notice that by accepting
arbitration, they waive the right to have a judge or jury decide medical malpractice claims).
102. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 500.3051-.3062
(1993 & Supp. 1994); Id. §§ 600.5033-.5065 (1987).
103. See supra note 92 (defining a contract of adhesion).
104. See Horn v. Cooke, 325 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the safeguards
included in the state's Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act ensure that the execution of all arbi-
tration agreements results in the knowing and voluntary waiver of one's right to a jury trial);
Moore v. Fragatos, 321 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a party seeking to
enforce an opposing party's waiver of his right of access to the court system must show that the
party was aware of all material information concerning arbitration).
105. See, e.g., Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. App. 1984) (holding that the
Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975, MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 600.5040-.5065 (1987), did not de-
prive plaintiffs of the constitutional guarantee of due process by requiring them to submit their
claim to arbitration).
106. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1179-84 (Cal. 1976) (address-
ing whether an agent acting on behalf of a group of employees can contract for medical services
wherein he agrees to arbitration of the employees' malpractice claims under the contract); but see
Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Coburn, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 433-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (vacating an
arbitration award for failure to disclose possible bias of the arbitrator).
107. See Dinong v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding a
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ing in a structured marketplace such as that envisioned by the
Health Security Act or other reform plans based on managed com-
petition. In fact, the Clinton proposal requires injured patients to
utilize their health plan's ADR mechanisms before filing a malprac-
tice suit. 108
As the health care system matures, it is likely that more innova-
tive methods of dispute resolution will be developed. Some of these
methods, such as proposals to pay economic damages on a no-fault
basis, may modify a patient's substantive as well as procedural
rights.' Subject to applicable law, integrated delivery systems that
elect to coordinate liability will probably experiment with these con-
cepts in their contractual arrangements.
E. Other Legal Considerations
1. Indemnification and Insurance
A health care enterprise that elects to assume the defense of mal-
practice suits affecting its constituent providers must make several
choices. First, it must decide whether to indemnify and defend its
affiliated physicians or institutional providers against malpractice
claims (which might be called "true enterprise liability"), or
whether simply to add its network of providers as co-insureds on a
single malpractice policy ("channeling"). Second, if it chooses to as-
sume direct liability, it must decide whether to purchase commercial
insurance to cover its risk or whether to self-insure110 in whole or in
part.
Kaiser-Permanente is the prototype for a managed care organiza-
group medical contract negotiated by the Civil Service Commission for government employees
against the plaintiff's claim that the arbitration clause was part of an adhesion contract); Madden,
552 P.2d 1178 (upholding the authority of the Board of Administration of the State Employees
Retirement System to represent state employees in negotiating group medical plans).
108. H.R. 3600, § 5302 (providing that no medical malpractice liability actions may be
brought until the final resolution of malpractice claims under the alternate dispute resolution sys-
tem adopted by the plan pursuant to § 5302(B)).
109. See MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TASK FORCE, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION AND THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF HOSPITAL ATTORNEYS, NON-TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS 14-28 (1987) (addressing medical malpractice arbitration and compen-
sation mechanisms); Geoffrey O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused Foreclosure of Personal
injury Claims By Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L.
REV. 589 (1983) (offering new ways to adapt existing personal injury compensation systems to
modern needs).
10. See infra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of self-insurance).
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tion that assumes direct liability for medical malpractice."' In the
Kaiser health system, Kaiser Foundation Health Plans, Inc.
("KFHP") maintains contracts with an affiliated hospital corpora-
tion called Kaiser Foundation Hospitals ("KFH") and with the
Permanente Medical Group ("PMG"), a partnership of physicians
who exclusively treat Kaiser patients. Pursuant to these contracts,
KFHP - the indemnitor - has agreed to indemnify KFH and/or
PMG - the indemnitees - for judgments arising from malpractice
affecting KFHP enrollees, and KFHP has the right and obligation
to defend any such suits.
From the indemnitee's point of view, indemnification agreements
are reliable only to the extent that the indemnitor is willing and able
to make good on its obligation. An important caution with respect to
indemnification rights relates to business failure. As the health care
industry integrates and consolidates to improve efficiency, many
health provider and insurance organizations will no doubt fail and
declare bankruptcy. Under federal bankruptcy law, contractual
rights to indemnification in cases of joint liability are held invalid
except to the extent that the indemnitee has already paid the in-
jured party on the underlying claim." 2 Even payments made in sat-
isfaction of a judgment will only be entitled to indemnification at
the recovery rate allowed to general creditors."1 3 Parties relying on
indemnification for malpractice judgments should therefore obtain
credit support, or at least security for their claims, at the time the
indemnification agreement is signed.
Even without an explicit transfer of liability, the economies of
scale and improved risk management capability associated with a
unified malpractice defense have been apparent for several years. As
a result, several health systems, including the Federation of Jewish
Philanthropies in New York City ("FOJP") and the Harvard Affili-
ated Medical Institutions in Boston, operate malpractice insurance
programs that offer private physicians the option of joining the in-
surance policy of the institution with which they are primarily asso-
ciated."' For example, Harvard's channeling program is available
111. See Elaine Zablocki, Tort Reform, HMO MAG., May-June 1994, at 74, 77.
112. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(e)(1)(1), 510(b) (1988).
113. Recovery may be minimal in the case of insurance companies. Under state insolvency
laws, beneficiaries and claimants of failed insurers share in assets equally with or in preference to
general creditors. See COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D §§ 22:84-87 (rev. ed. 1984) (discussing the insol-
vency of insurance companies and resulting claims, preferences, and distributions).
114. For example, the Harvard program includes approximately 6,400 physicians. HARVARD
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to physicians and dentists with teaching appointments who: (1) con-
duct a majority of their practices from offices at participating insti-
tutions, or (2) devote at least 75 percent of their professional effort
to such institutions. 11 5
FOJP's program, known as Voluntary Attending Physicians
("VAP"), 116 is typical of a channeling arrangement. In VAP,
nonemployed attending physicians at any of the five FOJP hospitals
become additional insureds on the professional liability policy of the
appropriate hospital. Physicians must apply for coverage and fulfill
VAP's underwriting criteria. Liability is not shifted by contract to
the hospital. VAP physicians remain directly liable for malpractice
and are named as individual defendants whether or not the VAP
hospital is a co-defendant, although defense and indemnification are
provided as co-insureds under the hospital's policy. Payments made
on behalf of VAP physicians are reported to the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank.1 7
Although channeling programs have not been studied thoroughly,
premiums charged to physicians in such programs have historically
been lower than traditional malpractice coverage. In general, reports
also suggest that these programs result in reductions in liability
costs and improved cooperation between physicians and hospitals.11 8
AFFILIATED MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS, MALPRACTICE INSURANCE PROGRAM INFORMATION BOOK-
LET 1993-1994, at 1 (1993) [hereinafter MALPRACTICE BOOKLET]; see also NEW YORK STATE
INSURANCE DEP'T., A BALANCED PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: REPORT ON THE NEW YORK STATE
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 18 (1988) (reporting that the Department
of Insurance gave permission to the FOJP Service Corporation and the Combined Coordinating
Council, Inc., to manage channeling programs in New York); Myron F. Steves, Jr., A Proposal to
Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationships in the Medical Professional Liability Insurance Sys-
tem, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1324-32 (proposing a shift of medical malpractice liability exposure to
institutional providers); Ann P. Wood, Channeling: Medical Liability Insurance Concept Being
Widely Discussed by Hospitals, PEDIATRIC NEWS, Jan. 1987, at 10 (reviewing the channeling
programs of the Harvard Affiliated Medical Institutions and the hospitals of the Federation of
Jewish Philanthropies).
115. MALPRACTICE BOOKLET, supra note 114, at Question 9.
116. FOJP SERVICE CORPORATION, VOLUNTARY ATTENDING PHYSICIANS PROFESSIONAL LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 1 (1993) [hereinafter INSURANCE PROGRAM].
117. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (discussing and explaining the National
Practitioner Data Bank).
118. See Channeling: What's in it for Doctors and Hospitals?, MED. STAFF NEWS. March
1986, at 4 (arguing that channeling - whereby physicians and hospitals are covered under the
same policy, share the same defense team, and enjoy premium rate savings - is the future of
health care); James F. Holzer, Channeling Programs Aid MD-Hospital Cooperation, HOSPITALS,
April 5, 1987, at 92 (discussing health care providers' exploration of channeling or nontraditional
risk financing arrangements whereby hospitals and physicians are insured by the same policy
while reducing potentially compensable events and patient injury); Robert Markowitz & Barbara
Challan, Confronting the Medical Malpractice Crisis: A View From the Bridge, 2 HEALTHCARE
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However, channeling programs have suffered from two accidents of
history. Before the rapid growth of managed care contracting, it was
difficult to enroll physicians in channeling programs and price their
participation appropriately because there were no formal agree-
ments between physicians and hospitals with respect to quality or
cost.119 In addition, channeling programs increase the potential pol-
icy exposure considerably and therefore require significant reinsur-
ance,120 which was not readily available in the insurance markets
until recently.
2. Networks and the Insurance Marketplace
As enterprise liability arrangements become more common, it is
likely that new forms of medical malpractice coverage and appropri-
ate pricing structures will evolve. However, the way that malprac-
tice insurance is currently offered presents several challenges to in-
novative health care enterprises.
Closed-panel institutions, whether they are hospitals that limit ad-
mitting privileges to an approved medical staff or HMOs that have
exclusive contracts with a medical group or physician network, are
easily adaptable to enterprise liability. For these enterprises, liabil-
ity for affiliated physicians would be borne in the same way as for
the health professionals they already employ, except that more care
for which they are potentially responsible is likely to be delivered
"off site. 1 21
Enterprise liability may be harder to create in the nonexclusive
provider networks that will dominate most geographic markets in
the near future. For example, although hospitals often purchase ex-
perience-rated coverage, traditional physician insurance is priced ac-
EXECUTIVE, Jan. - Feb. 1986, at 36 (discussing advantages of channeling including reduced cost of
medical malpractice insurance and the benefits to physicians of a joint defense with hospitals in
medical malpractice suits).
119. This is also the principal difficulty with Weiler and Abraham's proposal to "assign" physi-
cians to hospitals for the purpose of liability. See Abraham et al., supra note 5, at 357 (noting the
difficulty in legislatively mandating organizational liability).
120. Reinsurance means to insure again. It is the practice of one insurance company buying
insurance from a second company to protect itself against part or all of the losses it might incur in
honoring its claims. JOSEPH C. RHEA ET AL.. THE FACTS ON FILE DICTIONARY OF HEALTH CARE
MANAGEMENT 540 (1988) [hereinafter FACTS ON FILE].
121. A possible concern, however, is that the provision of malpractice insurance to affiliated
physicians might be construed by the Internal Revenue Service as incompatible with their tax
treatment as "independent contractors," especially if the institution is conducting quality assur-
ance activities that influence clinical practice. See Internal Revenue Serv. Exempt Organization
Guidelines Handbook § 337 (1992).
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cording to specialty and location. 2 As a consequence, patient vol-
ume strongly drives institutional premiums, but is seldom directly
related to physician premiums. Institutions that wish to provide en-
terprise liability to physicians for only those patients treated in asso-
ciation with the institution, such as a hospital-centered health plan
that wants to limit its responsibility to malpractice affecting the
plan's enrollees, may find themselves offering physicians nothing of
value, because physicians would still pay full price for residual
coverage. 23
For this reason, health plans that want to attract physicians and
build loyalty may often choose to cover the malpractice risk of a
physician's entire practice in the hope that, eventually, the majority
of patients seen by physicians who remain in the plan's network will
become plan enrollees. However, two problems may arise. First, to
the extent that nonplan patients participate in competitors' health
plans rather than in traditional fee-for-service insurance such as
Medicare, those competitors may "free ride" on the responsible
plan's liability.
More importantly, providing coverage for nonnetwork patients
may limit a health plan's ability to self-insure its malpractice risk.
Many health care facilities, such as large hospitals, reduce cost and
avoid state insurance regulation by self-insuring most or all of the
malpractice risk incurred in the operation of their businesses either
directly or through captive insurance companies.124 By contrast, pro-
viding coverage for "outside" patients as a benefit to network physi-
cians might be construed as selling insurance to those physicians
and therefore be subject to state insurance laws. As a result, even a
well-capitalized HMO or health insurer might be precluded from
self-insuring its physician network unless it qualified as a property
and casualty insurer in each applicable state. The health plan might
therefore be forced to purchase commercial coverage at a higher
price, although its size and bargaining power should allow it to ob-
122. See PATRICIA DANZON. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY 130 (1985) (explaining that institutional factors affect demand for insurance and may help
explain the lack of demand for risk retention in medical malpractice insurance).
123. FOJP addresses this concern for part-time employed physicians who maintain unaffiliated
private practices by offering them additional coverage for 50 percent of the full-time price. INSUR-
ANCE PROGRAM, supra note 116, at 3. Eventually, it is likely that a new market for residual
malpractice coverage will emerge.
124. The Harvard Affiliated Medical Institutions, for example, insure through the Controlled
Risk Insurance Company, Ltd., which is chartered in the Cayman Islands, British West Indies.
MALPRACTICE BOOKLET, supra note 114, at Question 1.
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tain a substantial discount.
3. "Deep Pocket" Liability
If malpractice liability is shifted from individual practitioners to
health care institutions or managed care plans, enterprises in juris-
dictions without legislative limits on damages may be plagued by
grossly excessive awards. In the current system, having to sue one's
personal physician is a barrier to both frivolous and meritorious
claims. Therefore, wealthy or well-insured institutions that elect to
bear enterprise liability most likely would attract a larger number of
claims, many for inflated amounts.125
However, legal limits on damages, particularly combined with
binding arbitration, can solve this "deep pocket" problem. As of
April 1993, twenty-one states had placed limits on noneconomic, ag-
gregate, or wrongful death damages in medical malpractice cases. 12 6
California's $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages has had the ef-
fect of reducing malpractice premiums. 2 ' In states with similar lim-
its, health care institutions and health plans that elect to bear liabil-
ity are likely to have more predictable losses and lower premiums.
Similarly, states that permit health plans to require patients to
resolve disputes through arbitration will be more conducive to enter-
prise liability. More than forty states expressly authorize some form
of alternative dispute resolution for medical malpractice claims.12 8
According to published data from Kaiser Permanente, its assump-
tion of liability subject to binding arbitration has decreased both the
frequency of claims and the size of awards. 29 However, institutions
relying on arbitration provisions to reduce "deep pocket" exposure
125. See Bradford C. Kendall, Note, The Ostensible Agency Doctrine: In Search of the Deep
Pocket?, 57 UMKC L. REV. 917 (1989) (discussing how courts have applied the ostensible ageny
doctrine to expand hospital liability for physician medical malpractice).
126. COMPENDIUM, supra note 16, at 2.
127. See generally James Ludlam, The Real World of Malpractice Tort Reform (Part I), 23
J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 353 (1990) (discussing various tort reforms with a look toward developing
an administrative process to settle medical malpractice disputes). Flat caps such as that employed
in California have been criticized as selectively penalizing seriously injured patients. A sliding
scale limit based on the severity and duration of injury would more fairly balance the needs of
patients and providers. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Schedul-
ing "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) (evaluating the merit of noneconomic
damages under the current liability system and methods that can be used to assist judges and
juries in computing damages for personal injury and death outside tort law's traditional methods).
128. See generally COMPENDIUM, supra note 16 (reviewing state legislation authorizing arbitra-
tion of medical malpractice claims).
129. See Leone, supra note 7, at 58.
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should recognize that judicial decisions in this area are highly fact-
specific.130
In the future, an even greater risk for health plans and other
health care institutions that are managing cost and quality is that a
medical malpractice case will be successfully recharacterized as a
coverage dispute by a plaintiff's attorney. This risk will arise
whether or not the institution has assumed enterprise liability by
contract, and may be unameliorated by traditional tort reform stat-
utes. Recently, in Fox v. Health Net of California,"' a jury
awarded the plaintiff $12 million in compensatory damages, almost
all of it for emotional distress, plus $77 million in punitive dam-
ages.132 Both sides elected to litigate the dispute around the defini-
tion of "investigational treatment" and the propriety of certain
managed care incentives.13 Presumably, plaintiff's counsel carefully
avoided alleging medical malpractice, which would have placed a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages.
From a policy perspective, in any system of comprehensive HMO-
style health insurance, disputes over coverage are by definition dis-
putes over the standard of care, resolvable according to established
principles of malpractice law. However, the Health Net verdict
demonstrates that our society is uncomfortable with a corporate
cost-benefit decision to explicitly assume the risk of personal injury,
and that this discomfort is not limited to Ford Pinto automobiles.'
Therefore, health plans and provider organizations can expect plain-
tiffs' attorneys seeking large punitive damages to exploit other liti-
gation postures in cases that might otherwise be considered mal-
practice disputes.
4. Reporting of Adverse Events
The National Practitioner Data Bank 3 5 ("Data Bank") was es-
130. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (discussing the enforceability and fairness
of arbitration provisions).
131. Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993).
132. Woolsey, supra note 8, at 1, 23; see also Lee, supra note 9, at DI (noting that the case
was subsequently settled for a lesser sum).
133. Woolsey, supra note 8, at 23.
134. See Steven C. Bennett, Developments in the Movement Against Corporate Crime, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 871 (1990) (reviewing FRANCIS T. CULLEN ET. AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER
ATTACK: THE FORD PINTO CASE AND BEYOND (1987)) (discussing the Ford Pinto case and the
movement against corporate crime to reassert the fundamental value of equal justice).
135. 45 C.F.R. § 60 (1994).
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tablished by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986136
in order to prevent physicians who have been judged dishonest or
incompetent from moving to another state and misrepresenting their
credentials. 13 7 All malpractice judgments against physicians and all
settlements made by or on behalf of a physician must be reported to
the Data Bank. 3 8 Under current law, institutions accepting enter-
prise liability would therefore be responsible for reporting physicians
to the Data Bank if a claim resulted in such payment.3 9
However, a health care system comprised of integrated health
plans has needs different from those of a fee-for-service practice.
Enterprise liability functions smoothly only if health plans and other
institutions are able to resolve disputes nonadversarially without ex-
posing physicians to the risk of arbitrary reporting.4 0 The Data
Bank and other malpractice reporting mechanisms must therefore
be revised to recognize the increasing importance of institutional lia-
bility and quality management in the health care system. Eventu-
ally, methods other than reporting of malpractice actions will be re-
quired to identify low-quality medical practitioners.
5. Fraud and Abuse
The interdependency encouraged by enterprise liability might
raise fraud and abuse concerns similar to those affecting many other
managed care arrangements. Government control of Medicare'
and Medicaid"" was originally predicated on a fee-for-service model
of health care delivery. As health care providers have joined to-
gether, often to achieve economies of scale and other efficiencies in a
136. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784
(1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-152 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
138. Id. § 11131 (Supp. V 1993).
139. See id. § 11131(a). Section 11131(a) of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 reads in relevant part: "Each entity ... which makes payment under a policy of insurance,
self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judg-
ment in, a medical malpractice action or claim shall report . . . information respecting the pay-
ment and circumstances thereof." Id.
140. There is a growing consensus that the Data Bank is struggling. Because of the randomness
and error associated with individual reports, the AMA has changed its position on the Data Bank
and now advocates the Data Bank's dissolution. AMA Board of Trustees, Resolution of June 15,
1993; see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEMS: NATIONAL PRAC-
TITIONER DATA BANK CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE PROBLEMS (1993) (reporting inadequacies in
the Department of Health and Human Services' management of the Data Bank).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
142. Id. § 1396.
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capitated or partially capitated environment, strict compliance with
the broad kickback and self-referral prohibitions contained in ex-
isting law has become problematic. This is particularly threatening
to nonprofit providers because violations of fraud and abuse laws
that confer private benefits may jeopardize such providers' tax-ex-
empt status.
For example, the provision of malpractice coverage for physicians
in less-than-fully integrated systems might be construed as a pay-
ment made to induce referrals. Although the jurisdiction of the Of-
fice of the Inspector General is currently confined to Medicare and
Medicaid abuses, 4 s it is likely that national health reform will ex-
pand that authority to include all payers. As a result, enterprise lia-
bility might be difficult to implement unless clear safe harbor pro-
tection1" is available.
6. Reckless or Intentional Conduct
Although parties bearing enterprise liability should not be held
liable for grossly negligent or intentional acts of individual provid-
ers, 4 5 plaintiffs' attorneys may use such claims to gain strategic ad-
vantages. In the current tort system, these allegations may bully
physicians who are fearful of incurring punitive damages into set-
tling negligence claims. In the future, plaintiffs' attorneys can be
expected to bring many such claims in the hopes of bringing defend-
ants into conflict with each other, pressuring settlements, and avoid-
ing arbitration or other forms of ADR. To avoid this scenario, par-
ties bearing enterprise liability may elect to defend all claims,
including those for intentional torts, but also maintain some level of
deterrence by retaining rights to indemnification from individual
providers for damages based on intentional or reckless conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
Enterprise liability need not be perceived as a burden imposed on
health care organizations and physicians from outside the health
care system. Instead, it can be used voluntarily by such enterprises
143. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1(a) (1993).
144. Safe harbor regulations are issued by the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") to
inform health care providers how to conduct their business affairs in compliance with the Medi-
care and Medicaid statutes. Id. § 1001.952 (1993).
145. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, § 8, at 33-39 (discussing the meaning of intent and the
tendency to impose greater responsibility on one whose conduct is intended to cause harm).
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to create a coordinated system of contract-based accountability that
promotes collaboration, improves quality, and reduces overall liabil-
ity costs.
Enterprise liability will prove to be of greatest benefit to those
health systems that selectively employ or contract with practitioners,
have close ties to hospitals and other facilities, apply strict standards
for credentialing and privileging providers, and conduct meaningful
peer review and quality assessment activities. For these entities, as-
suming liability is a sound business practice that simplifies the dis-
pute resolution process and reduces burdens on physicians while also
encouraging them to participate in the quality improvement efforts
of the entire enterprise.
This Article explains the logic behind a systematic, contractual
approach to malpractice liability, and identifies some of the legal
and practical issues that are likely to arise. It is important to em-
phasize, however, that enterprise liability is not the solution to the
problems that surround medical malpractice, but merely one way to
move the liability system in the same direction as the rest of the
health care industry.
Finally, no scholarly treatment of a health care issue can capture
the complexity of actual practice. Right now, in the real world, en-
terprise liability is happening because it increases efficiency and
reduces costs. Undoubtedly, health care lawyers and businesspeople
will develop far more sophisticated approaches to malpractice ac-
countability than have been presented in this article. The critical
point to remember is that innovation is the only lasting cure for
America's health care crisis, not only in clinical care but in the way
that the health care system is organized and functions.
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